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This paper empirically investigates the extent to which the financial linkages of Latin 
American banks with the exterior are influenced by political risk and deposit dollarisation. 
We find that the sum of banks’ foreign assets and liabilities is a function of risk-return 
considerations and excess domestic credit demand. An increase in political risk is shown to be 
associated with a build-up of foreign positions by the banking sector, but this adverse effect 
on the banking system is mitigated in economies with a high share of dollarised deposits. 
These relationships largely hold when the determinants of foreign assets and liabilities are 
estimated separately, with risk-induced capital flight being moderated by a high degree of 
deposit dollarisation. While changes in overall country risk including the risk of macro 
collapse drive official capital outflows, for a wider measure of capital flight including 
informal flows only changes in political risk matter. In each case, deposit dollarisation is 
shown to possess a risk-mitigating property. The results suggest caution with active de-
dollarisation strategies in highly dollarised economies where political instability remains an 
issue.     
JEL No: E42, F36, G21 
Keywords:  dollarisation, political risk, banking systems, financial integration, Latin America 
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Non-technical summary 
Financial dollarisation, i.e. residents’ holdings of assets or liabilities in foreign currency, has 
increased or remained stubbornly high in many Latin American economies since the 1990s, in 
spite of the generally successful implementation of macroeconomic stabilisation policies over 
the same period. The presence and persistence of financial dollarisation has been broadly 
explained by a number of factors in economic literature, including lack of monetary 
credibility, hedging against macroeconomic volatility, transaction costs and dollar network 
externalities, financial market incompleteness and moral hazard. While these determinants of 
financial dollarisation are firmly established in the literature, the effects of financial 
dollarisation are relatively less well researched in comparison. There is broad consensus 
among academics and policymakers that the co-existence of different currencies in the 
balance sheets of financial institutions exacerbates the vulnerability of banking systems and 
hampers the smooth operation of the monetary transmission mechanism, yet there are fewer 
studies which try to explore the specific channels through which these vulnerabilities may 
come to light or the circumstances under which they may apply.  Honohan and Shi (2003) 
provide mixed evidence on the effect of dollarisation on bank interest rate margins and the 
exchange rate passthrough, as well as on the propensity of banks and non-bank residents to 
place dollarised deposits offshore. De Nicoló et al. (2003) find that dollarisation of the 
banking system is likely to promote financial deepening albeit only within relatively high 
inflation environments. 
Our paper aims to contribute to this strand of the financial dollarisation literature by exploring 
the mechanisms driving financial linkages of Latin American banking sectors with the 
exterior and some specific factors which may affect them. We combine an empirical 
exploration of the determinants of the foreign positions of Latin American banking sectors, 
i.e. the sum of banks’ foreign liabilities and foreign assets, with the impact that dollarisation 
and political risk may have on these positions.  We find that the sum of banks’ foreign assets 
and liabilities is a function of risk-return considerations and excess domestic credit demand.  
We also find that an increase in political risk propels capital outflows (including informal 
ones), and that high deposit dollarisation mitigates the incidence of capital flight that is 
otherwise caused by a worsening of the political environment. These relationships largely 
hold when the determinants of foreign assets and liabilities are estimated separately. The 
results suggest caution with the implementation of active de-dollarisation strategies in highly 
dollarised economies where political instability remains an issue. 
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1  Introduction 
Financial dollarisation, i.e. residents’ holdings of assets or liabilities in foreign currency, has 
increased or remained stubbornly high in many Latin American economies since the 1990s, 
notwithstanding the generally successful implementation of macroeconomic stabilisation 
policies over the same period. In economic literature, the presence and persistence of financial 
dollarisation
1 has been broadly explained in terms of (i) lack of monetary credibility and 
memory of hyperinflationary periods, or hedging against macroeconomic volatility; (ii) high 
costs of switching from foreign to domestic currency, or externalities associated with a large 
network of dollar users; (iii) financial market incompleteness and (iv) moral hazard due to 
explicit or implicit government guarantees. While these determinants of financial dollarisation 
are firmly established in the literature, the effects of financial dollarisation are relatively less 
well researched in comparison. There exists a broad consensus among academics and 
policymakers that the co-existence of different currencies in the balance sheets of financial 
institutions and other economic agents exacerbates the vulnerability of banking systems and 
hampers the smooth operation of the monetary transmission mechanism. However, there are 
fewer studies which try to explore the specific channels through which these vulnerabilities 
may come to light or the circumstances under which they may apply. Honohan and Shi (2003) 
provide mixed evidence on the effect of dollarisation on bank interest rate margins and the 
exchange rate passthrough, as well as on the propensity of banks and non-bank residents to 
place dollarised deposits offshore. De Nicoló et al. (2003) find that dollarisation of the 
banking system is likely to promote financial deepening albeit only within relatively high 
inflation environments. 
Our paper aims to contribute to this strand of the financial dollarisation literature by exploring 
the mechanisms driving financial linkages of Latin American banking sectors with the 
exterior and some specific factors which may affect them. We combine an empirical 
exploration of the determinants of the foreign positions of Latin American banking sectors, 
i.e. the sum of banks’ foreign liabilities and foreign assets, with the impact that dollarisation 
and political risk may have on these positions. First, we seek to verify that banks’ foreign 
liabilities (e.g. borrowing from abroad) depend on excess domestic credit demand and the 
availability of domestic deposits, while banks’ foreign assets (e.g. deposits of residents 
                                                           
1 Financial dollarisation needs to be distinguished from payments dollarisation (use of foreign currency for 
transaction purposes) and real dollarisation (de facto or de jure indexation of prices and wages to foreign 
currency).  Other commonly used terms in economic literature are full or official dollarisation (adopting a 
foreign currency as unique legal tender), and partial dollarisation (denoting economies with a high degree of 
payments and/or real dollarisation, but short of full dollarisation). In this paper, we focus on a specific aspect of 
financial dollarisation, namely the dollarisation of domestic (onshore) bank deposits. 
6
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 744 
March 2007      
abroad) rise with the degree of country (political) risk – an effect which may be regarded  as 
“capital flight”. Second, we investigate whether highly dollarised economies exhibit a 
differentiated behaviour in terms of the adverse effects of rising political instability on 
banking systems. Third, after testing the determinants of the composite foreign position, we 
also examine the determinants of the foreign asset and liability sides separately in order to 
disentangle these differential effects and verify the individual hypotheses, in addition also 
accounting for informal capital flows. Our sample consists of 14 Latin American countries in 
the period of 1992-2001, and we use panel estimation techniques throughout the analysis. 
Anticipating some of our results, we find that the sum of banks’ foreign assets and liabilities 
is a function of risk-return considerations and excess domestic credit demand. In addition, an 
increase in political risk propels capital outflows (including informal ones), and high deposit 
dollarisation mitigates the incidence of capital flight that is otherwise caused by a worsening 
of the economic and political environment. These relationships largely hold when the 
determinants of foreign assets and liabilities are estimated separately, with political risk-
induced capital flight (in the form of higher foreign assets of banks) moderated by a high 
degree of deposit dollarisation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief summary of 
the recent literature on the determinants and effects of financial dollarisation. Section three 
presents the empirical framework, describes sample properties and data sources underlying 
the empirical tests, and provides some stylised facts on recent evolution of foreign assets and 
liabilities and deposit dollarisation in Latin American banking systems. The results of our 
econometric analysis are detailed in section four. Section five concludes and discusses policy 
implications. 
2 Financial Dollarisation in the Literature 
Economic literature offers several explanations for the presence and persistence of financial 
dollarisation. A first set of arguments stress a lack of monetary credibility and how this may 
influence the actions of economic agents. In this context, Calvo and Guidotti (1990) show that 
the absence of a policy pre-commitment is associated with a strong incentive to monetise the 
debt stock by public authorities, leading to the establishment of indexed (or foreign currency 
denominated) securities. Jeanne (2003) includes both public and private debt to show that as 
the probability of an exchange rate devaluation rises, agents are rationally induced to borrow 
in foreign currency so as to minimise the probability of default. Savastano (1996) relates 
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deposit dollarisation specifically with macroeconomic or financial instability, possibly due to 
a history of monetary mismanagement which hampers the credibility of stabilisation policies. 
This legacy of inflationary memory, in turn, helps to account for the continued presence of 
dollarised deposits in the economy even in a context of price stability (also referred to as 
“dollarisation hysteresis” or “ratchet” effect); Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) suggest that high 
variability of inflation in relation to that of the real exchange rate may account for persistent 
dollarisation (see below). Persistence of dollarisation has also been explained by depositors’ 
reluctance to incur in additional currency-switching or set-up costs (Uribe, 1997). Network 
effects, once a sufficiently large pool of foreign currency (dollar) users has been formed, may 
also help to account for this trend.  
A second strand of the literature portrays financial dollarisation as a necessity resulting from 
financial market development or incompleteness. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) 
suggest that domestic financial rigidities result in an undervaluation of the interest premium 
between borrowing in home and foreign currency, pushing agents to borrow in the latter. 
Hausmann et al. (2001) suggest that the drive to borrow in foreign currency is associated with 
“original sin”, or agents’ inability to borrow externally in their own currency (or domestically 
at long maturities).  A number of models frame financial dollarisation in the wider context of 
an optimal financial equilibrium under a portfolio model for banking intermediation. Catão 
and Terrones (2000) apply risk-return considerations and market segmentation to account for 
discrepancies between banks’ dollarised assets and liabilities, finding that dollarisation tends 
to depend on initial conditions (i.e. credit market structure, marginal costs of intermediation 
and the share of performing loans). Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) put forward the concept of a 
‘natural’ degree of dollarised deposits determined by the volatility of inflation and the real 
exchange rate; deviations from this optimal share of dollarisation are explained by the 
willingness of depositors to hold domestic currency deposits on account of higher interest 
rates. 
A third set of arguments depicts financial dollarisation as derived from “socially excessive 
dollarisation” in the economy resulting from moral hazard considerations, including implicit 
public insurances associated to operating under a fixed exchange rate peg, or related to 
troubled domestic financial institutions and bailout expectations (Dooley, 2000). These 
implicit public guarantees encourage larger risk-taking than would otherwise be the case.  
Barajas and Morales (2003) empirically test many of theoretical determinants detailed above, 
referred to as “the usual suspects” of financial dollarisation (i.e. history of unsound 
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macroeconomic policies, development and institutional factors, moral hazard opportunities 
related to government guarantees). The authors find that less common explanations - 
including ongoing central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, relative market 
power of borrowers, and financial penetration – are at least as important as the traditional 
factors in accounting for financial dollarisation. Rennhack and Nozaki (2006) empirically 
corroborate that a minimum variance portfolio as well as currency depreciation and 
uncertainty about inflation determine the degree of financial dollarisation. 
By contrast, the effects of financial dollarisation are relatively less well researched in the 
literature. There exists a broad consensus among academics and policymakers that financially 
dollarised economies tend to be more vulnerable than non-financially dollarised ones, as the 
co-existence of different currencies in the balance sheets of financial institutions and other 
economic agents exacerbates the vulnerability of banking systems. Gulde et al. (2004) support 
this conclusion on the basis of estimates of non-performing loans and probabilities of firms’ 
insolvencies. Systemic liquidity risk in dollarised economies is associated with a “perceived 
increase in country risk, or banking risk, prompting depositors to convert their deposits into 
cash dollars or transfer them abroad”.
2 The experience of central banks operating in highly 
dollarised economies also suggests that the effective conduct of monetary policy is much 
more complex than would otherwise be the case. The main challenges in this context are 
associated with a reduced effectiveness of monetary transmission channels (notably, interest 
rates) as well as a very unstable nature of monetary aggregates (Morales, 2003).   
There are fewer studies which try to explore the specific channels through which these 
vulnerabilities may come to light or the circumstances under which they may apply. In this 
context, Honohan and Shi (2003) provide evidence that bank interest margins, exchange rate 
pass-through, and offshore deposits by non-bank residents are positively associated with 
(increasing) dollarisation; the authors also find that banks tend to place offshore up to half of 
dollar deposits received. However, as the authors acknowledge, the evidence that real deposit 
interest rates increase with dollarisation is weak, as it cannot be shown that higher 
dollarisation is associated with a widening of spreads between local and foreign currency 
rates. Arteta (2003) finds that the probability of banking crisis is not affected by a high degree 
                                                           
2  This seems to be supported by country-specific experiences with runs on dollar liabilities, as has been the case 
in Bolivia. See Gulde et al. (2004), p. 5. 
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of either deposit or credit dollarisation. Finally, De Nicoló et al. (2003) suggest that deposit 
dollarisation has a positive impact on financial deepening in inflationary environments
3.    
3  Empirical Framework and Data 
3.1 Baseline specification 
We depict international financial linkages of banks as being caused by the interaction of 
macroeconomic dynamics, as expressed by excess domestic credit demand affecting foreign 
liabilities (FL), and risk-return considerations, as denoted by external deposit spreads and 
country risk scores determining foreign asset positions (FA). As dependent variable denoting 
international financial linkages of banks, we use a measure proposed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2003), i.e. the sum of foreign liabilities and foreign assets relative to GDP 
(irrespective of the actual offshore location and limited in our case to foreign positions of the 
banking system)
4.   
As explanatory variables we use a host of standard determinants common in the financial 
dollarisation literature to account for the dynamics of banks’ foreign assets and liabilities (e.g. 
De Nicoló et al (2003), Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003)) and subsequently apply this framework 
to test whether highly dollarised economies behave differently to less dollarised ones in the 
face of political risk. Insofar as foreign assets of banks (FA) are concerned, the share of 
offshore deposits is conjectured to be determined by the variance of political risk (POLR) that 
is not compensated for by the spread between interest rates on onshore and offshore foreign 
currency deposits (SPR).  This implies that banks’ foreign assets are a positive function of 
total deposits (DEP) and the variance of political risk (POLR)
 5, and a negative function of the 
external deposit rate spread (SPR) multiplied by total deposits (DEP). Insofar as foreign 
liabilities (FL, the stock of past and current bank borrowing from abroad) are concerned, these 
are conjectured to depend on credit to the private sector (CPS) and negatively on the 
availability of total onshore deposits (DEP). This implies that a given demand for domestic 
                                                           
3   Estimates are based on the ratio of onshore foreign currency deposits to total domestic bank deposits, with 
financial deepening proxied by the ratio of M2 to GDP. The differentiated effect of dollarised economies in the 
light of inflation is captured by an inflation-dollarisation interaction term. We use a similar interaction term in 
our empirical analysis (section 4). 
4   While it may be suboptimal to relate stock variables to a flow variable, this type of normalisation avoids 
endogeneity problems that would occur if foreign bank positions were related to the size of the banking sector, 
for example. This would occur as the right hand side variables CPS and DEP are each an integral part of total 
assets (liabilities), causing correlation between the two sides of the regression equation. 
5 In section 4.2.2, we test for a broader measure of country risk, accounting for macroeconomic risk, which 
together with political risk comprises country risk, and for a subcomponent of political risk, expropriation risk. 
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bank credit (CPS) cannot entirely be satisfied by the available pool of domestic deposits 
(DEP), and domestic financial institutions can only close this financing gap by incurring 
liabilities abroad (FL)
6.  
As a result, the baseline empirical model has the following basic specification: 
FLAit = β0i + β1 CPSit + β2 DEPit + β3 (DEP*SPR)it + β4 POLRit + εit ,      
                (+)           ( ?)                (-)                       (+) 
There are a number of caveats to this set-up. First, in order to avoid unwarranted endogeneity 
in the regression equation, foreign assets (FA) are related only to the pool of onshore deposits, 
(DEP) that can be shifted abroad if the interest rate spread narrows (i.e. irrespective of the 
share of offshore deposits that should be accounted for as well).  As a growing pool of 
domestic deposits would increase the volume of offshore deposits (assuming the cross-border 
share to be constant) but would also diminish the need for foreign borrowing, there could be 
offsetting effects of total deposits on the dependent variable (positive for FA, negative for FL) 
and the expected sign (and significance) of the DEP variable is uncertain. 
Second, as interest rate data on onshore foreign currency deposits is not systematically 
available in many Latin American economies (as also noted by Honohan and Shi, 2003), the 
spread between U.S. deposit rates (in dollars) and onshore deposit rates (in home currency) is 
used as a proxy for SPR. This means that in the empirical investigation the real interest rate 
spread adjusted for exchange rate movements is measured as: 
D
US D NER i i
SPR
π +
∆ + ∗ + − +
=
1
)) 1 ( ) 1 (( ) 1 (
,        
where iD is the domestic deposit rate in home currency,
7 iUS is the dollar deposit rate in the 
U.S.,  ∆NER is the annual change in the average nominal bilateral exchange rate (with a 
positive value denoting a depreciation), and πD is the domestic inflation rate. Some margin for 
measurement error remains in this variable, since idiosyncratic country risk may skew the 
spread upward beyond what would otherwise be required to compensate for exchange rate 
                                                           
6 Banks’ lending operations are assumed to be confined to the domestic economy. 
7 The IMF’s International Financial Statistics from which we take the deposit rates do not detail whether the 
figures are period averages or year-end. 
11
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 744
March 2007      
depreciation vis-á-vis the US-dollar
8. Third, the effect of a change in the domestic political 
environment is measured by the levels of the risk rating
9 and not by the variance of country 
risk. This is done because using the second moments (i.e. volatility) of country (political) risk 
is arguably counterintuitive in cases where a successful stabilisation policy that helps to 
gradually reduce macroeconomic (political) variability is being pursued, as has been the case 
of some of the Andean or Central American economies under examination.  
3.2 Sample Properties and Data Sources 
 
The sample comprises data on 14 South and Central American economies
10 for 1992-2001. 
Outside of this period, data on deposit dollarisation are scant and thus unsuitable for panel 
estimation. Some countries were omitted from the sample altogether due to lack of data 
(Belize, Guatemala, Guyana) or because of not allowing dollarised deposits in the first place 
(Brazil). Some Caribbean economies were left out due to their status as offshore financial 
centres.  
As regards data sources, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) was used for annual 
data on foreign liabilities and assets of domestic banks, total onshore deposits (i.e. domestic 
deposits in home and foreign currency, DEP), domestic lending (i.e. banks’ claims on the 
domestic private sector, CPS), and deposit interest rates at home and in the US. All variables 
of assets and liabilities are scaled by GDP in order to eliminate pure size effects. The political 
risk rating used is a measure contained in the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), an index widely applied in empirical studies. The PRS Group supplies risk estimates 
based on information collected by its own staff which results in the publication of 22 
variables in three subcategories (economic, financial, political) for 140 countries on a monthly 
basis. The political risk rating is aimed at measuring the probability of adverse domestic 
political events
11 that would threaten property rights or depositor’s access to their funds, 
                                                           
8 However, correlation analysis between the calculated and the actual real interest rate spreads of those (seven) 
countries that did publish data on onshore foreign currency deposits rates for at least five consecutive years (i.e. 
half of the sample period) reveals an average correlation coefficient of +0.55. This suggests that it is a rough but 
reasonable approximation. The overall correlation coefficient rises to +0.68 if Uruguay is omitted from the 
sample, the difference perhaps being due to the country’s status as a financial centre with the overall lowest 
foreign currency deposit rates during the sample period. 
9  In alternative regressions (not reported), the variance of the political risk rating (POLR) resulted to be 
insignificant throughout. 
10 Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
11 The subcategories of the political risk measure are: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, the 
investment profile, internal and external conflict, corruption, military and religion in politics, law and order, 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and the quality of the bureaucracy. We annualized the ICRG’s 
monthly observations by taking the arithmetic mean. 
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promoting “capital flight” in line with the model specifications. The variable POLR has been 
rebased to indicate increased risk of locations rather than safety by subtracting the original 
rating score from 100 (the theoretically maximum value). Data on dollarisation of onshore 
deposits was obtained from previous compilations assembled by other authors from the IFS 
and various central bank publications.
12 A summary of the definitions and sources of the 
variables is provided in the Appendix (Table 11). 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The development of cross-border financial linkages, while generally on the rise, has been 
quite heterogeneous across the sample countries (Table 1). Mexico’s total asset and liability 
position rose steadily over the period, but other economies such as Ecuador and Venezuela 
saw a decline in this context. Chile’s financial linkages with the exterior levelled off over the 
period due to a larger domestic deposit base (+ 16 percentage points of GDP) enabling the 
country to meet rising credit demand. Uruguay represents a special case, as the country serves 
as a financial hub for part of the region. 
Table 1. Foreign liabilities and foreign assets as a percentage of national GDP 
  1992 2001 
  FLA  FL FA  FLA  FL FA 
Argentina  5.82  4.22 1.60 8.85  6.16 2.69 
Bolivia  3.30  1.83 1.47  10.95  1.00 9.95 
Chile  9.09  7.73 1.37 8.15  1.78 6.37 
Colombia  3.76  2.84 0.92 2.12  1.43 0.69 
Costa Rica  2.60  0.26 2.34 5.90  3.65 2.25 
Ecuador  1.00  0.31 0.69 0.34  0.11 0.22 
El Salvador  0.21  0.06 0.15 1.31  0.63 0.68 
Honduras  2.47  0.33 2.14 8.63  0.81 7.82 
Mexico  0.62  0.07 0.55  11.58  4.06 7.52 
Nicaragua  3.91  1.36 2.55 8.31  4.85 3.45 
Paraguay  4.37  0.68 3.69 7.40  0.99 6.41 
Peru  4.01  1.22 2.79 4.77  2.24 2.53 
Uruguay  37.83  8.58 29.25  89.73  43.85 45.88 
Venezuela  2.81  0.46 2.35 1.11  0.33 0.78 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Deposit dollarisation shares have also varied considerably across the sample of countries (see 
Charts 1 and 2). We classify countries as highly dollarised if at some point during the sample 
period the share of dollarised deposits was 50% or higher. This means, for example, that El 
Salvador is classified as a high dollarisation economy even if dollar deposits were not the 
                                                           
12 We use dollarisation data compiled separately by Patrick Honohan, Carlos Arteta, and Adam Honig. The 
primary dataset is that of Honohan on account of its more updated coverage. Sporadic data gaps were filled by 
resorting to the other two datasets, whose numbers are broadly comparable to those contained in Honohan’s set. 
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norm prior to 2001, while Costa Rica falls into the low dollarisation category in spite of  
moderate deposit dollarisation (with a share of between 30% and 45% of the total).  
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The fact that the share of dollarised onshore deposits trended up over time in many cases (or 
remained broadly unchanged in others) points to the possible presence of hysteresis. The 
literature (e.g. Oomes, 2003) has advanced three main arguments for the persistence of high 
dollarisation ratios even after instances of successful stabilisation of the domestic economy. 
First, “inflationary memory” may lead agents to question whether the achievements of the 
stabilisation in terms of lower inflation and more stable exchange rates will indeed be 
permanent. Only after a certain period of successful politics will they then even consider 
switching out of foreign currency assets. Second, there may be ‘switching’ costs or, more 
generally, ‘transaction’ costs such as taxes on purchases of foreign currency. Therefore, a 
certain expected change in inflation or depreciation is required to induce holders of dollar 
instruments to convert them into local currency ones. Finally, there may be positive 
externalities associated with having a large network of dollar users in the sense that agents 
learn how to use foreign-currency instruments efficiently (Uribe, 1997).
13  
It should also be noted that restrictions on the holding of foreign currency deposits 
domestically were in place in some locations (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela; to be 
captured empirically by the country-specific intercept). 
4  Econometric Analysis 
The econometric setup consists of pooled OLS estimation with country fixed effects and 
White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances, including a degrees of freedom correction 
throughout. Whenever necessary, serial correlation in the error terms is controlled for by 
including a common AR(1) coefficient, in which case random effect estimation ceases to be 
an alternative specification.  
4.1 Baseline Regressions 
The results of the baseline regression in Table 2 are broadly in line with the conceptual 
framework. The domestic lending variable, CPS, has the expected sign and is highly 
significant, suggesting that there is indeed a positive linkage between domestic lending to the 
private sector and the foreign positions of the banking sector. The domestic deposit variable, 
                                                           
13  The emergence of such a network can be considered a financial innovation which provides lower (marginal) 
user costs through economies of scale, irrespective of rate-of-return considerations. In highly dollarised 
economies deposits are not readily shifted to the exterior when there is a marked deterioration in the domestic 
political environment. Generally speaking, for such hysteresis to occur the utility of having ready access to 
foreign currency assets for ‘store-of-value’ or transaction purposes despite infringement risks must exceed the 
utility of storing assets in a safer but rather impractical location elsewhere. 
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DEP, is insignificant as might have been expected. In spite of the possible measurement error, 
the term of domestic deposits multiplied by the external deposit spread, DEP*SPR, has high 
statistical significance. This suggests that a sufficiently high external interest rate spread 
combined with an ample deposit base is associated with a relatively large share of deposits 
being held domestically rather than abroad. Surprisingly, when being measured in levels, high 
political risk (POLR) cannot be statistically associated with a high volume of offshore 
positions by banks.  
A common AR(1) coefficient corrects for strong serial correlation in the error terms. Without 
both country fixed effects and correction for serial correlation, the adjusted R-squared falls to 
below 0.3. This finding remains largely unchanged if Uruguay is omitted, which is a clear 
outlier in the sample as shown in Table 1 (see alternative regression results in the Appendix, 
Table 12). The bias that the inclusion of Uruguay otherwise introduces in the sample is 
reduced such that the AR(1) coefficient halves in value. It should also be noted that the 
significance of the deposit-spread term drops to the 10%-level. 
In order to test whether highly dollarised economies exhibit a differentiated behaviour relative 
to less dollarised ones, we construct an interaction term, POLR*DOLLAR, to test whether 
dollarisation (as expressed by the share of dollarised deposits in total onshore deposits) can 
act as a buffer against political risk.  This is done in the vein of De Nicoló et al. (2003), who 
interact inflation with deposit dollarisation and find that “dollarisation has the effect of 
moderating the adverse effect of inflation on financial depth” (p. 21). As the estimates in 
column B illustrate, the interaction term carries the opposite sign of POLR and narrowly 
misses statistical significance at the 10%-level. This result already points weakly to the risk-
mitigating property of deposit dollarisation, and is accentuated when the baseline regressions 
are re-estimated using variables’ first differences (i.e. changes measured in percent of the 
previous year’s level). This is done to test whether (i) between-group or within-group effects 
drive the individual results, and (ii) the outcome is robust when taking into account the large 
autocorrelation of the errors.  
To retain the levels information of the time series, a cointegration framework should be 
employed. However, the traditional panel cointegration framework requires a sufficient 
number of time periods as the asymptotic theory assumes that N and T tends to infinity (e.g. 
Phillips and Moon 1999, 2000). If the number of time series observations is small (here: 
T=10), the cointegration parameters cannot be estimated reliably. Furthermore, the estimated 
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AR(1) parameter of the error is even larger than unity (see Table 2). This result suggests that 
there is no long-run relationship between the variables.
14 
Table 2. Latin America; Estimation in Levels  
 (A) (B) 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
CPS  0.282 (2.84)  0.281 (2.87) 
DEP  -0.049 (-0.44)  -0.049 (-0.45) 
(DEP*SPR)  -0.001 (-2.82)  -0.001 (-2.96) 
POLR  0.026 (0.59)  0.058 (1.20) 
(POLR*DOLLAR)       -0.079  (-1.54) 
AR(1) 1.291  (12.08)  1.291  (12.16) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.959 0.959   
Durbin-Watson stat.  1.861 1.860   
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 0.000   
 Dependent variable: FLA; number of observations: 126 (all countries included) 
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
As shown in Table 3, estimating first differences instead of levels presents some remarkable 
differences as regards the impact of political risk. With pure level or between-group effects 
eliminated, the new risk variable denoting the change in the political risk rating (∆POLR) is 
significant at the 10%-level. If Uruguay is omitted, this risk variable reaches the 5%-level (its 
t-statistic rises to 2.00; see Table 13 in the Appendix). This suggests that it is not the absolute 
level of political risk but rather an increase (decrease) over time that is associated with the 
build-up (drawdown) of foreign positions by the banking system.  
Table 3. Latin America; Estimation in First Differences 
 (C)  (D) 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
∆CPS  0.886 (2.06)  0.809 (1.93) 
∆DEP  0.258 (0.75)  0.275 (0.88) 
∆DEP*∆SPR  3.05E-05 (0.13) 4.19E-05 (0.19) 
∆POLR  0.645 (1.81)  1.788 (5.02) 
∆POLR*DOLLAR     -0.037  (-4.09) 
AR(1) -0.224  (-1.99)  -0.309  (-2.53) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.218  0.294   
Durbin-Watson stat.  2.120  2.244   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001  0.000  
 Dependent variable: ∆FLA; number of observations: 112 (all countries included) 
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
                                                           
14 The small number of time periods does not allow to test the hypothesis that there is no cointegration 
relationship, as these tests (Pedroni 1999, Kao 1999) assume large N and T.  
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Adding the risk-dollarisation interaction term in first differences (∆POL*DOLLAR) causes the 
political risk variable ∆POL and the interaction term itself to become significant at the 1%-
level. Multicollinearity of ∆POLR and ∆POLR*DOLLAR is not a concern because the T-
statistic rises (from 1.81 in (C) to 5.02 in (D)) with the inclusion of this interaction term, 
instead of decreasing (which would indicate collinearity). The coefficient attached to ∆POLR 
is a linear function of the form: 1.788 - 0.037 *  DOLLARit, meaning that the positive 
coefficient of ∆POLR (1.788) is diminished by the factor 0.037 relative to each additional 
percentage point of deposit dollarisation. The insignificant coefficient of the spread 
interaction term might reflect the fact that a widening of interest rate spreads could lead to 
extreme changes when measured in percentages of the initial level. It should also be noted 
that serial correlation is close to being eliminated. In this instance, even when including fixed 
effects and a much less dominant AR(1) term, the adjusted R-squared declines to more 
normal levels (0.22 and 0.29).   
These outcomes suggest that significant deposit dollarisation moderates the adverse effect of 
an increase in political risk on the build-up of foreign positions by the banking system. 
Without prejudice to other well-known vulnerabilities of dollarised financial systems (e.g. 
currency mismatches in bank balance sheets), this points to a ‘positive’ side effect of deposit 
dollarisation on financial systems under certain political environments.  In order to double-
check these results, we re-ran regression (D) with the sample split into countries with low and 
high dollarisation of deposits respectively (according to the classification in Charts 1 and 2), 
thereby making the additional interaction term obsolete. As reported in Table 14 of the 
Appendix, the significantly positive relationship between incremental political risk and the 
build-up of foreign positions by the banking system holds in the six less dollarised economies.  
In contrast, shifts in political risk do not cause foreign holdings to vary in highly dollarised 
economies, as was the case in regression (D)
15.  
We also tested a number of other exogenous variables not covered by the baseline 
specification that could potentially have explanatory power: GDP per capita (proxying the 
state of economic development), different measures of capital account restrictions 
                                                           
15 In a similar set of regressions the sample was split into years broadly preceding and following the Asian crisis 
(not reported separately). Again, ∆POLR is highly significant in both samples. However, the risk-dollarisation 
interaction term turns out to be insignificant in the 1992-1997 period, while it is highly significant and negative 
estimate for 1998-2001 sample. 
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(representing obstacles to a free choice of location of positions),
16 and the nominal bilateral 
exchange rate (possibly influencing the value of the holdings). However, none of these 
additional determinants reached statistical significance.  
4.2 Disaggregation into Liabilities and Assets 
It is instructive to scrutinise the individual components of the aggregate integration variable. 
To verify whether the theoretical relationships prescribed by the model in equations (2) and 
(3) hold, we regress banks’ foreign assets (FA) and foreign liabilities (FL) separately on their 
respective determinants.  
4.2.1 Changes in Foreign Liabilities 
First, we examine the determinants of banks’ foreign liabilities. The empirical outcome 
reported in Table 4 substantiates the results found previously for the aggregate measure, with 
coefficient estimates for FL shown both in levels (regressions (E) and (F)) and then in first 
differences (in (G) and (H)). As it turns out, the insignificant result for the domestic lending 
variable (CPS) in column (E) is caused by the counterintuitive positive association that, when 
regressed separately, the domestic deposit variable (DEP) surprisingly has with foreign 
liabilities (β=0.124, t-stat.=1.86; not reported separately). When total domestic deposits are 
omitted, CPS becomes significant at the 5%-level, and this remains the case when estimated 
in first differences (columns (G) and (H)). 
We also consider an alternative, narrower measure of domestic banking liabilities, namely 
longer-term deposits or “quasi money”, as defined by the IMF (i.e. the sum of time, savings 
and foreign currency deposits, excluding demand deposits). Using first differences, this 
longer-term deposit variable ∆LTDEP exhibits a negative sign and is moderately significant 
(column (H)). This result might reflect the banks’ desire to avoid a maturity mismatch 
between assets and liabilities, using mostly longer-term deposits to lend on to corporate 
borrowers.  
                                                           
16 One of these was the widely-used measure AREAER, representing the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. AREAER classifies all sample countries as “unrestricted” by 1997, 
with only 4 of 14 country having imposed restrictions until then. Hence, there is no much variation, neither 
across countries nor years. Nevertheless, we did detect some significance of capital restrictions for the change in 
foreign liabilities when added to equation (H), with AREAER being moderately significant (t-stat=1.79), but the 
variable has a counterintuitive positive sign. The measure was insignificant for the change in foreign assets 
(section 4.2.2, t-stat=0.54; when added to equation (M)) and for the composite outflow variable including 
informal flows in section 4.3 (equation (T), with t-stat=0.89), which is unsurprising since capital restrictions 
should not play a role when simultaneously accounting for informal outflows. 
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Table 4. Latin America; Foreign Liabilities  
 (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I) 
Variable Coeff.  T-stat.  Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.  Coeff.  T-stat.
CPS  0.031 (0.66)  0.105 (2.36)    
DEP  0.109 (1.34)     
∆CPS     2.035 (2.15) 3.467 (2.23)   
∆INV       1.400  (2.71)
∆LTDEP     -2.082 (-1.86)  0.364  (0.56)
AR(1) 1.178  (13.70)  1.158 (13.03) -0.160 (-1.68) -0.188 (-1.56)  -0.164  (-1.32)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.935    0.931 0.093 0.120   0.058 
Durbin-Watson stat.  2.165    2.175 2.183 2.143   2.181 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000 0.052 0.025   0.145 
Dependent Variable  FL   FL  ∆FL  ∆FL    ∆FL 
 Number of observations: 126 (E+F) / 112 (all countries included) 
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
Finally, to control for the possibility that CPS is endogenous to banks’ foreign liabilities due 
to scale effects we use gross fixed domestic investment (INV) as an instrument for domestic 
credit. The proxy turns out to be even more significant than CPS in column (H) with ß=0.099 
and t-stat.=3.98. Column (I) shows the results for the preferred equation encompassing 
changes in domestic demand and long-term deposits, this time using ∆INV instead. Again, the 
instrument is highly significant, although the deposit measure is now insignificant. In sum, we 
are able to shed light on the validity of this part of the empirical model. 
4.2.2 Changes in Foreign Assets 
Turning to the determinants of banks’ foreign assets, the estimation outcome in Table 5, 
column (J), shows that all explanatory variables are entirely insignificant when measured in 
levels and the result displays strong correlation in the residuals despite incorporating an 
AR(1) correction term. 
Sizeably different results emerge if first differences are used. As depicted in column (K), all 
exogenous variables are correctly signed, if partly insignificant, and the AR(1) coefficient is 
also rendered insignificant. The coefficient of the deposit-spread interaction term is 
unexpectedly positive. This is probably due to the influence of ∆DEP because when 
estimating the spread variable SPR exclusive of the interactive component in column (L), we 
observe a negative sign. At any rate, both regressions (K) and (L) are fraught with omitted 
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variable bias as the adjusted R-squared is very low at 0.04 and the F-statistic denoting the 
probability of joint variable misspecification far above statistically acceptable levels.  
Table 5. Latin America; Foreign Assets  
 (J)  (K)  (L)  (M) 
Variable Coeff.  T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
DEP  -0.045 (-1.33)    
DEP*SPR  3.1E-04 (-1.16)    
POL  0.033 (0.71)    
∆DEP   0.137 (0.56) 0.152 (0.60)  0.111  (0.22)
∆SPR   -0.006 (-1.33)   
∆DEP*∆SPR   4.1E-04 (2.00)   4.3E-04  (2.06)
∆POLR   0.980 (2.42) 0.993 (2.42)  2.557  (5.32)
∆POLR*DOLLAR     -0.050  (-3.72)
AR(1) 1.102  (6.82) 0.011 (0.09) 0.010 (0.09)  -0.097  (-0.80)
Adjusted R-squared  0.940  0.052 0.043   0.148 
Durbin-Watson stat.  1.094  2.047 2.044   2.087 
Prob(F-stat.) 0.000 0.174 0.213  0.014 
Dependent Variable  FA   ∆FA    ∆FA    ∆FA 
 Number of observations: 126 (J) / 112 (all countries included) 
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
Regarding the unexpected results for ∆DEP and ∆DEP*∆SPR, it should be recalled – as 
already explained in the previous section – that ideally the sum of total onshore and offshore 
deposits should be used as an explanatory variable. Unfortunately, in order to forestall 
endogeneity bias, which the inclusion of offshore deposits on the right hand side would cause, 
we are forced to adopt the narrower measure of total onshore deposits. This means that while 
we are unable to prove the hypothesised effect of the deposit base, we cannot rule out either 
that the relationship would hold if these variables were defined more properly. Consequently, 
the results found for DEP and DEP*SPR should not be over-emphasised. 
The highly significant estimation outcome for political risk and the risk-dollarisation 
interaction term in the last regression (M) reflects the results found for the composite measure 
of total foreign banking positions. This suggests a more unstable political environment indeed 
induces capital flight in the form of increased foreign assets. In contrast, a high degree of 
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deposit dollarisation, as depicted by the risk-dollarisation interaction term, is shown to have a 
risk-mitigating property
17. 
In order to ascertain whether it is indeed a change in political risk – and not other types of 
country risk – that is associated with movements in foreign balances, we re-estimate 
regressions (K) and (M), now using the macroeconomic risk measure (MACROR), which 
together with political risk signifies overall country risk, and, separately, a sub-component of 
political risk, the so-called investment profile, essentially depicting expropriation risk 
(EXPROPR). As columns (N) through (P) in Table 6 illustrate, the measure of 
macroeconomic risk is highly significant, both in isolation and when estimated jointly with 
the risk-dollarisation term, supporting the previous empirical findings. By contrast, the 
expropriation measure is not significant in isolation, and judging by the F-statistics we cannot 
rule out the possibility that the coefficients are jointly not different from zero. Overall, the 
power of the three estimations, depicted by adjusted R-squared, is quite weak – in all cases 
below 0.08 – which is lower than the R-squared=0.15 found in equation (M). Hence, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that macro collapses by themselves cause the transfer of assets 
abroad. Nonetheless, macroeconomic risk and headline political risk appear to be strongly 
correlated, which begs the question whether we should rather look at headline country risk. 
Using the first differences of ICRG’s rebased country risk index (∆COUNTRYR) we find that 
it is indeed the interplay between macro and political risk that is relevant for changes in 
foreign assets, see columns (Q) and (R). The variable shows the highest coefficient and 
significance of all risk measures in (Q), and even the dollarisation interaction term reaches the 
1%-level of significance in (R).  
We conclude that political risk is able to explain cross-border capital transfers but that the 
effect is magnified by also accounting for macroeconomic instability. In the following section 
we will show, however, that it is only political risk that matters when additionally including 
informal capital movements. 
                                                           
17 Importantly, when the interaction term ∆POLR*DOLLAR is included in the final specification, the fit of the 
estimation improves considerably, evidenced by R-squared almost tripling in value. 
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Table 6. Latin America; Change in Foreign Assets – Alternative Risk Measures 
  (N) (O) (P) (Q) (R) 
Variable Coeff.  T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff.  T-stat.  Coeff. T-stat.
∆DEP  0.158 (0.61) 0.159 (0.61) 0.145 (0.55) 0.177 (0.68) 0.175 (0.71)
∆DEP*∆SPR  3.9E-04 (1.74) 3.7E-04 (1.79) 3.6E-04 (1.96) 3.9E-04 (1.58)  3.6E-04 (1.61)
∆MACROR 0.932  (3.07) 1.427 (3.56)   
∆MACROR*DOLLAR   -0.014 (-2.04)    
∆EXPROPR   0.164 (0.864)    
∆COUNTRYR   1.478  (3.51)  2.791 (6.53)
∆COUNTRYR*DOLLAR      -0.039 (-3.71)
AR(1) -0.030  (-0.25) -0.048 (-0.40) 0.039 (0.31) -0.027  (-0.23)  -0.101 (-0.84)
Adjusted R-squared  0.069  0.079 0.016 0.092    0.151
Durbin-Watson stat.  1.992  1.968 2.055 2.011    2.002
Prob(F-stat.) 0.117  0.098 0.357 0.065    0.012
Dependent Variable  ∆FA    ∆FA  ∆FA  ∆FA    ∆FA 
 Number of observations: 112 (all countries) 
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
 
4.3  Accounting for Informal Capital Flows 
The preceding estimations have considered official capital positions only. In reality, a 
significant part of cross-border capital flows is carried out through informal channels. It is 
also evident that domestic investors when faced with expropriation of deposits at local banks 
are likely to choose informal channels for transferring their funds to offshore locations. Such 
– possibly unlawful – capital flight adds to official private sector capital outflows already 
accounted for in the change in banks’ foreign assets. Unsurprisingly, it is difficult to measure 
such covert transactions not registered in official statistics. Thus, researchers have resorted to 
including the position “errors and omissions” (E&O) of the balance of payments to proxy 
informal capital flows. Cuddington (1986) aims to measure capital flight, or “hot money”, by 
adding the errors and omissions to selected short-term capital outflows – a composite measure 
also considered by Cumby and Levich (1987), Antzoulatos and Sampaniotis (2001) as well as 
Schneider (2003).  
By definition, the errors and omissions partly depict the difference between changes in a 
country’s actual reserves and those officially registered in the external statistics (the 
“omissions” part). Apart from the influence of statistical errors and wilful misinvoicing of 
trade flows, which may both be substantial in some cases, this difference in reserve changes 
can be thought to represent informal cross-border flows. Referring to Table 7, we find that for 
most countries the sum of official and informal outflows has a similar magnitude as official 
outflows only (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay); 
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in some cases there were noticeable, yet economically plausible differences in some years 
which are to be attributed to capital flight (Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Nicaragua in the 
first half of the past decade, and Ecuador and Venezuela more recently).  
Table 7. Deviations of official and informal flows from changes in  







Argentina 14.5  37.8  1995 
Bolivia 102.6  395.1  1994 
Chile 6.7  74.4  1994 
Colombia 12.2  -84.0  1994 
Costa Rica  -76.2  -158.3  1994 
Ecuador 256.0  1204.0  2001 
El Salvador  956.0 4782.5 1998 
Honduras -54.7  -137.6  1994 
Mexico 50.8  267.8  1995 
Nicaragua -99.2  -302.8  1996 
Paraguay 6.9  -118.1  1994 
Peru -39.2  -123.0  1993 
Uruguay -6.5  -13.9  1994 
Venezuela 118.6  294.3  2001 
* a positive number denotes additional informal flows adding to official flows 
Nevertheless, we posit that in one sample country, El Salvador, the statistical errors most 
likely dominate the picture. In spite of El Salvador’s successful stabilization policy, the 
entries for errors and omissions in the BoP dwarf the official change in foreign assets in the 
latter part of the sample period, which in all likelihood reflects systematic measurement 
errors. As El Salvador thus constitutes a statistical outlier, we exclude the country from the 
following set of estimations
18. 
Notwithstanding obvious measurement problems we decided to use this measure to depict 
unregistered capital movements. Furthermore, it is methodologically difficult to measure 
stocks of unofficial capital invested abroad, as it is not clear whether or not flight capital 
depicted in the E&O over the years has returned to the source country in the interim. We 
therefore restrict our analysis to adding the E&O to the respective changes in foreign assets 
(∆FA) and re-estimate equations (F) and (H), now using the composite measure. Table 8 
                                                           
18 The justification for treating El Salvador as an outliner in the sample is also based on the fact that all 
explanatory variables turned out to be insignificant when El Salvador was included in the estimations, 
contrasting the significant results for risk and risk-dollarisation terms when omitting the country (in Table 8). 
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reports the estimations outcomes for the composite capital flow measure (“capital flight”, 
termed CF). 
Table 8. Latin America; Change in Foreign Assets plus Unofficial Outflows 
 (S)  (T)  (U) 
Variable Coeff.  T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. 
∆DEP  0.269 (0.41) 0.269 (0.41) 0.274 (0.42) 
∆DEP*∆SPR  0.002 (0.84) 0.002 (0.84) 0.002 (0.81) 
∆POLR  1.985 (1.79) 5.700 (3.37)  
∆POLR*DOLLAR   -0.129 (-2.19)  
∆MACROR   -1.681 (-0.82) 
AR(1) -0.264  (-1.32) -0.110 (-0.83) -0.148 (-1.05) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.313  0.357 0.314  
Durbin-Watson stat.  1.636  1.647 1.721  
Prob(F-stat.) 0.000  0.000 0.000  
Dependent Variable  CF  CF  CF  
 Number of observations: 104 (all countries except El Salvador) 
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
 
As estimations (S) and (T) illustrate, political risk is still a driving force even for the 
composite measure, with the point estimate doubling in magnitude, albeit now only at the 
10%-level of significance. Adjusted R-squared jumps from 0.05 to above 0.30. A similar 
picture emerges for the estimation with the risk-dollarisation term. Again both political risk 
and the interaction term have the right signs and are significant at least at the 5%-level. We 
also try the change in macroeconomic risk (∆MACROR), which is the complement to political 
risk in overall country risk. Interestingly, while the point estimate is almost as high as for 
∆POLR, macroeconomic risk comes out insignificant in equation (U) and carries the wrong 
sign.  
These results have us conclude that it is indeed exclusively political risk and not genuine 
economic risk that drives capital outflows, both official and unofficial. We interpret the 
results as follows: As long as the political environment is sufficiently stable capital leaves the 
country in reaction to an economic downturn through the banking channel, whereas informal 
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4.4 Are Southeast Asian Economies Different? 
Aiming to cross-check the empirical results, we also run a different set of regressions for nine 
Southeast Asian economies
19. Unfortunately, two countries known for their high degree of 
dollarisation (Cambodia and Lao P.D.R.) had to be excluded from the sample due to lack of 
available data. Hong Kong was omitted due to its role as a global financial centre, which 
would have created substantial bias in the sample (strong residual serial correlation even 
when incorporating an AR(1) term).  
The levels estimation reported Table 9 partly corroborates the results of the Latin American 
sample as lending to the private sector is significantly positive (albeit only at or near the 5%-
level) while the deposit variable remains non-significant. The deposit-spread interaction term 
and the political risk variable are not found to have explanatory power. The estimate for the 
separately included risk-dollarisation variable (column W) should thus be interpreted with 
caution, notwithstanding its level of significance. We also conduct a first differences 
estimation, which in the Latin American sample brought to light that increasing political risk 
is associated with higher foreign positions of the banking sector unless the economy is highly 
dollarised. However, as the results in Table 10 illustrate, this relationship does not appear in 
the sample of Asian economies.  These results might be influenced by the consistently low 
levels of political risk observed in most of the Asian economies under examination over the 
sample period
20. 
Table 9. Southeast Asia; Estimation in Levels  
 (V) (W) 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
CPS  0.198 (1.98)  0.193  (1.89) 
DEP  -0.084 (-0.80)  -0.112  (-1.14) 
DEP*SPR  -0.003 (-0.37)  2.79E-04  (-0.09) 
POLR  0.012 (0.08)  -0.083  (-0.52) 
POLR*DOLLAR      0.004 (2.24) 
AR(1) 0.523  (5.24)  0.519  (4.85) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.811  0.815   
Durbin-Watson stat.  1.935  1.976   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  0.000   
 Dependent variable: FLA; number of observations: 81  
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
 
                                                           
19 Bangladesh, China (Mainland), Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Vietnam. 
20 Note that the equations are clearly misspecified since the hypothesis of an F-test that the regressors are jointly 
zero cannot be rejected at conventional statistical levels. This should be kept in mind when evaluating the 
counterintuitive signs and significance levels of the credit and deposit variables. 
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Table 10. Southeast Asia; Estimation in First Differences 
 (X)  (Y) 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
∆CPS  -0.075 (-1.05)  -0.085 (-1.22) 
∆DEP  1.051 (3.50)  1.130 (3.68) 
∆DEP*∆SPR  -0.007 (-2.79)  -0.008 (-2.97) 
∆POLR  0.173 (0.34)  1.116 (1.23) 
∆POLR*DOLLAR     -0.052  (-1.33) 
AR(1) 0.271  (2.73)  0.280  (2.88) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.109  0.110   
Durbin-Watson stat.  1.904  1.863   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.092  0.099  
 Dependent variable: ∆FLA; number of observations: 72 
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
This paper has explored the mechanisms driving financial linkages of Latin American 
banking sectors with the exterior and some specific factors which may affect them. It has 
combined an empirical testing of the determinants of the foreign positions of Latin American 
banking sectors - the sum of banks’ foreign liabilities and foreign assets - with the incidence 
that dollarisation and political risk may have on these positions.  
First, we have empirically explored the determinants of the composite measure of foreign 
banking assets and liabilities. Second, we have explored whether highly dollarised economies 
exhibit a differentiated behaviour in terms of the adverse effects of increased political 
instability on banking systems. Third, after testing the determinants of the composite foreign 
position of banks, we have also examined the determinants of the foreign assets and liabilities 
separately in order to disentangle these differential effects and verify the individual 
hypotheses.   
The empirical findings broadly establish that the sum of banks’ foreign assets and liabilities is 
a function of risk-return considerations and excess domestic credit demand. An increase in 
country risk (both macroeconomic and political uncertainty) is shown to be associated with a 
build-up of foreign positions by the banking sector, but this adverse effect on the banking 
system is mitigated in economies with a high share of dollarised deposits. This finding is 
robust to estimating the determinants of foreign assets and liabilities separately, with risk-
induced outflows (in the form of higher foreign assets) being moderated by a high deposit 
dollarisation. These results hold even when augmenting the capital outflow measure by 
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including informal outflows which we proxy by the position “errors and omissions” of the 
balance of payments. Interestingly, for this combined measure, which can be termed overall 
capital flight, only the change in headline political risk matters whereas macroeconomic risk 
does not. This result suggests that the official banking channel is used for transfers to offshore 
locations when overall country risk rises, whereas informal channels outside the financial 
system are resorted to specifically in cases of increased political risk.  
Our results contribute to the discussion about the effects of deposit dollarisation on financial 
systems. There is widespread consensus amongst academics and policymakers that financially 
dollarised systems are particularly vulnerable, primarily due to the currency mismatches in 
banks’ balance sheets and the associated challenges for supervisory and regulatory authorities. 
However, the findings of this and other studies before it (e.g. De Nicolo et al, 2003) suggest 
that, under certain environments, a high degree of deposit dollarisation may have positive side 
effects (in this case, a more stable bank deposit base amid political instability). This suggests 
caution with the implementation of active de-dollarisation strategies in highly dollarised 
economies where political instability remains an issue. 
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Appendix 
Table 11. Definitions and Sources of Variables  
Variable name 
empirical   model 
Definition Source 
FL  Foreign liabilities of deposit money banks 
and other banking institutions, scaled by 
GDP 
International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) published by the 
International Monetary Fund 
FA  Foreign assets of deposit money banks 
and other banking institutions, scaled by 
GDP 
IFS 
FLA  Sum of foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities (as defined above) 
IFS 
CPS  Claims on private sector of deposit money 
banks and other banking institutions, 
scaled by GDP 
IFS 
DEP  Domestic deposits (checking, time, 
savings and foreign currency deposits) of 
deposit money banks and other banking 
institutions, scaled by GDP 
IFS 
SPR  Spread between deposits rates on 
domestic local currency deposits and US 
dollar deposits in the U.S., corrected for 
the annual change in the nominal bilateral 
exchange rate (same year) and domestic 
inflation  
IFS 
POLR  Political risk rating assessing government 
stability, socioeconomic conditions, the 
investment profile, internal/external 
conflict, corruption, military/religion in 
politics, law & order, ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability, and the quality 
of the bureaucracy; rebased to: 
POLR=100–original score  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) of the Political 
Risk Services Group (PRS) 
EXPROPR  Subcategory investment profile in POLR   PRS-ICRG 
MACROR  Macroeconomic risk rating accounting for 
financial and economic risk categories  
PRS-ICRG 
COUNTRYR  Sum of POLR and MACROR PRS-ICRG 
DOLLAR  Share of foreign currency deposits in total 
domestic deposits 
Databases by P. Honohan, as 
well as C. Arteta, and A. Honig  
LTDEP  Domestic time, savings and foreign 
currency deposits (i.e. excluding checking 
deposits Î “quasi money”) 
IFS, as reported by the World 
Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 
INV  Gross fixed investment, scaled by GDP  IFS 
CF  “Capital flight”, ∆FA plus “errors and 
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Table 12. Latin America without Uruguay; Estimation in Levels  
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
CPS  0.230 (2.85)  0.226 (2.71) 
DEP  -0.068 (-1.06)  -0.068 (-1.07) 
DEP*SPR  -0.001 (-1.59)  -0.001 (-1.61) 
POLR  0.024 (0.46)  0.043 (0.82) 
POLR*DOLLAR       -0.036  (-1.09) 
AR(1) 0.640  (5.39)  0.655  (5.56) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.837 0.836   
Durbin-Watson stat.  2.030 2.045   
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 0.000   
 Dependent variable: FLA; number of observations: 104  
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
Table 13. Latin America without Uruguay; Estimation in First Differences 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
∆CPS  0.845 (1.89)  0.773 (1.79) 
∆DEP  0.259 (0.67)  0.308 (0.86) 
∆DEP*∆SPR  5.39-05 (0.22) 4.16E-05 (0.19) 
∆POLR  0.721 (2.00)  1.827 (5.05) 
∆POLR*DOLLAR     -3.877  (-3,80) 
AR(1) -0.234  (-2.07)  -0.315  (-2.53) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.217  0.289   
Durbin-Watson stat.  2.131  2.249   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001  0.000  
 Dependent variable: ∆FLA; number of observations: 104  
 Estimates incorporate fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity consistent covariances 
Table 14. Latin America; Estimation in First Differences 
       (Sample Split According to Degree of Dollarization) 
 (Dollarisation  Low) (Dollarisation  High) 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
∆CPS  0.068 (0.43)  1.359 (2.17) 
∆DEP  0.891 (2.24)  0.276  (-0.24) 
∆DEP*∆SPR  0.002 (1.97) 4.16E-05  (-0.42) 
∆POLR  1.357 (4.59)  1.792  (-0.12) 
AR(1) -0.303  (-2.15)  -0.309  (-0.98) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.504  0.072   
Durbin-Watson stat.  2.544  1.999   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  0.193  
 Dependent variable: ∆FLA; number of observations: 48 (E), 64 (F) 
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